A less Catholic and more evangelical Brazil? A youth detached from religions? A scenario of affirmation of religions of African origin? Other religions gaining more space? These are some of the questions that permeated the news coverage and hundreds of posts on social media as soon as the team at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) made public, on the morning of June 6, 2025, the data on religion from the 2022 Brazil Census.
The ISER research team offers, in the points listed below, a first look at the data released by IBGE and indicates, in a preliminary way, the main trends in the religious framework in Brazil in the second decade of the 21st century. They certainly challenge new research, studies and reflections.
A plural Brazil from the point of view of religions
Data from the 2022 Census show that the religious field in Brazil remains quite dynamic: the growing diversification and pluralization of the country's religious framework was already observed in the 2000 and 2010 Censuses and is confirmed in this one.
Since the 1950s Census, a trend toward change in the hegemony of Catholicism in Brazil has been emerging. In the portrait that the Census provides of the country, new actors began to appear in that decade, among them evangelicals, especially Pentecostals, but also other religions and people who declare themselves to have no religion. This picture continued to emerge until the 1980s, when these transformations intensified. Brazil remains predominantly Christian, but it is noteworthy that, in the last four decades, there has been a 12% drop in the number of Christians in Brazil – from 95.6% in 1980 to 83.6% in 2022.
A closer look at the numbers released now reaffirms a religious and more plural country:
📉Catholics are 56.7% – a decrease of -12.7 percentage points (-8.3% compared to 2010)
📉Spiritists are 1.8% – a decrease of -0.3 percentage points (-14.3% compared to 2010)
📈Evangelicals are 26.9% – an increase of 5.2 percentage points (+23.9% compared to 2010)
📈Afro-based religions (classified as Umbanda and Candomblé, but there are others in this group) are 1,00% – an increase of + 0.7 percentage points (+233% compared to 2010)
📈Other religions are 4,00% – an increase of + 1.3 percentage points (+48% compared to 2010)
📈Without religion there are 9.3% – an increase of +1.4 percentage points (+17% compared to 2010)
Catholics: between decline and hegemonic presence
The decline in Catholicism, maintained in the 2022 Census data, had been accentuated over the last four decades. However, it is noteworthy that, for the first time, there has been a slight reduction in the downward trend. Catholicism is still the majority religion in Brazil and in all major regions of the country, with its highest concentration in the Northeast (63.9%), followed by the South Region (62.4%). Among the states, Piauí is the most Catholic (77.4%), while Roraima is the one with the fewest followers of this religious confession (37.9%). Catholics are the predominant group in 5,322 of Brazil's 5,570 municipalities, and make up half the population in 4,881 of them.
Regarding the decline of Catholicism, it is necessary to consider social changes: large migration from the countryside to large cities since 1950, generational changes, changes in the way people experience religion and practice their faith, and other dynamics that the country has experienced in recent decades. It is important to note that Brazil has changed, and so have its relationships with religion and religious dynamics.
To contain the decline, the Catholic Church has taken action and reacted. It has been taking measures to slow down or curb “competition” in the religious field, the loss of followers to other religions and hegemony. Therefore, we see a Catholicism in Brazil that seeks to modernize its language and its forms of communication. It is worth recognizing that Pope Francis played an important role, with his more international presence, his charisma of leadership close to the people, and his visit to Brazil in 2013, which was emblematic and motivating. It was during this visit that the World Youth Day took place, which marked a rapprochement between the Catholic Church and this age group. The Vatican also organized the Synod of the Amazon, with an emphasis on a region that has been losing the most followers to the evangelical field.
On the other hand, a conservative advance in politics and other areas of public life can be observed among followers of this religious group, which has been the subject of research promoted by ISER.
Even with the decline and the growth of evangelicalism, which stands out due to the trend in the numbers in this edition and in previous censuses, the Catholic Church will continue to be the religious group with the largest number of followers. It may remain in this position, even if it is in decline and the number of evangelicals continues to grow. This is because evangelicals currently make up less than half of the Catholic contingent. This is a huge difference. The Catholic Church maintains a leading role in Brazilian social life, prevailing in the cultural imagination, in the liturgical and civic calendars, and in the main national traditions.
Evangelicals: between growth, visibility and previously inflated numbers
The 2022 Census figures show that one in four inhabitants of Brazil are evangelicals. This is a consolidation of the growth of this group, which has intensified over the last four decades, although at a slower pace since 2010 (+6% in 2000, +6.3% in 2010 and +5.2% in 2022). The numerical jump of around 50%, as had happened between the 1980s and 90s, was contained according to the last three surveys. The growth rate in the last Census already indicated at least a maintenance of this pace.
According to several public comments, it caught the attention of journalists, analysts and the public interested in the topic, that the IBGE numbers in relation to evangelicals have been below 30%. There were previous approaches that even indicated that this religious group would surpass the number of Catholics. In fact, it is possible to recognize an exaggerated expectation of exponential growth of the evangelical segment, driven by the “feeling” of dominance of this religious segment in the public space. However, the data did not reflect this expectation. Although there is growth among evangelicals, it is a little more moderate in relation to the last censuses.
It is possible to assess that the strong and growing presence in party politics, culture, sociability and social issues with a lot of media visibility, drew attention to this religious group in the public scene. This was due to the naturalized Catholic hegemony in the national scene and the imaginary of a “natural religion of Brazil”. For this reason, there has been greater and concentrated public, media and political interest in the evangelical field since the last Census in 2010.
Evangelicals have indeed grown in number (26.9% compared to 21.7% in the previous Census), are present in politics and are widely more present in cultural expressions – in social media, music, the market, soap operas, and popular language. This is a very relevant fact, because the more they grow, the more Brazilianized they become. Or, probably, they have grown more, as they have become more acculturated to the Brazilian reality.
Regarding the slowdown in growth, it is possible to observe a combination of factors. Evangelicals have been less monolithic since the 1990s. The ways of living evangelical religiosity have also varied. Today we have autonomous churches, independent cells, ministries, unchurched people, religious influencers, prayer groups on whatsapp. In addition to fragmentation, there are countless ways to live an evangelical religiosity without necessarily being linked to a denominational church.
At the same time, although the number of religious temples has increased, and this is a figure from the Census itself, this has not translated into the number of faithful. One hypothesis is that the expansion of temples may not mean a multiplication in the number of faithful, but rather a fragmentation, with the opening of dissident churches. Furthermore, it is also important to emphasize the generational issue. A young person with an evangelical mother may declare himself to be without religion because he is not attending her church. Although evangelicals are younger than Catholics, there is a large proportion of young people without religion, as will be highlighted below.
Qualitative research and empirical observation show something that needs to be better monitored and confirmed: the erosion of a type of Christianity among evangelicals themselves, with an emphasis on financial prosperity. There is also a less solid connection between the faithful, different from the culture of evangelical movements of the past that called for a more committed conversion to the churches. And it is necessary to consider the emergence of political radicalization, since the 2018 electoral process, with the adhesion of evangelicals to the consolidated Christian right, which brings people together but at the same time alienates members.
The non-religious: the third group in the portrait of religions in Brazil
The number of people who declare themselves to be “without religion” has been increasing for several editions of the IBGE Census and will become even higher in the 2022 Census. The main change occurred between the 1980s and 2000s, when the “without religion” number went from 1.5% to 7%. Today, it is 9.3%.
The “non-religious” represent an important part of the movement to diversify the Brazilian religious scene. According to the IBGE, this group includes those who claim not to have a religion, atheists and agnostics. However, this identity does not mean that those who declare themselves as such do not attend a religious community or do not have faith.
Those who declare themselves "without religion" represent a larger share than all non-Christian religious affiliations combined (9.3% compared to 5.0%). Within this group, young people (aged 15 to 29) stand out: they make up 40.3%d of the population without religion. This reveals a progressive decrease in the generational transfer of religious affiliation and an expansion of the possibility for personal exploration and choice among young people.
Other factors, such as the loss of Catholic hegemony and the growth of evangelical denominations and religions of African origin, as noted in this Census, may confirm that a large proportion of young people live in multi-religious families, which legitimizes the institutional disengagement of young people who declare themselves “without religion” (whether to make their personal summaries or to subsequently find motivation for new institutional ties).
The great proportional growth of Afro-Brazilian religions
The achievement of one percentage point, for the first time, by traditions of African origin in the 2022 Census (an increase of 233% in relation to the 2010 Census), reveals the result of the movement to value this group (which in the Census appears as Umbanda and Candomblé). This is due to the expansion of the racial debate in Brazil. Traditions of African origin are black traditions. These numbers, therefore, reflect a broad movement of affirmation of this racial identity, of valuing black ancestry, on the one hand, and of political, cultural and community mobilization of religious leaders and terreiro collectives, on the other.
It is important to consider the role of public policies for racial inclusion, such as quotas, which give black people greater access to universities and are a space for critical education; and the mandatory teaching of Afro-Brazilian and African history and culture in the school curriculum. All of this has significantly expanded the racial debate in society. As a result, a process of redefining faith, religious affiliation and ethnic-racial identity often occurs.
In this discussion, it is necessary to take into account religious racism, which has been a pillar of Brazilian society since the colonial period. In this sense, a greater debate on race helps not only to dispel prejudices, but also leads people to better understand these traditions of African origin.
At the same time, there is also the historical work of religious people of African origin in their actions of resistance, creation of memory and patrimonialization, which gain new visibility in the age of social networks. All of this brings in new followers and helps people who previously declared themselves Catholic and Spiritist to now declare themselves Afro-religious.
Despite this, it is possible that there is a considerable underreporting of followers of African-based religions in the Census data. This is directly related to religious racism, which continues to structure Brazilian society and continues to grow.
It is also important to consider the fluidity and porosity of religious practices in Brazil. Devotions often do not fit into the rigid categories of census forms. Dual religious affiliation, transitions and confluences are common, but in this context, religions of African origin end up being underrepresented — both due to methodological rigidity and the structures of prejudice that still surround them.
It is not yet possible to conclude…
As indicated in the introduction, this is a first look at the figures released. They certainly instigate new reflections. It is worth noting in this context that the IBGE question is open-ended: “What is your religion or cult?” and it can be seen from the figures that the population feels freer to declare what their relationship with religion really is.
It is a social, political and cultural atmosphere that is different from previous periods in which there were constraints and limitations on the public declaration of ties that were different or opposed to hegemonic Catholicism. It is in this sense that plurality emerges.